He has served in a variety of operational space and missile assignments including Minuteman III Combat Crew, Satellite Operations, and 614th Air Operations Center Combat Operations. The directorate supports command strategic engagements with the Combatant Commands, Cyber Service Components, and Department of Defense agencies.Ĭol Iven entered the Air Force in 1996 as a graduate of the Reserve Officer Training Corps at Cornell University. The directorate is responsible for developing cyberspace operational strategies, campaign plans, and contingency plans. Iven serves as the Director of Strategy, Engagements, and Plans, Joint Force Headquarters – Department of Defense Information Network. Such a provision, which would in effect tangibly embody a no-first-use commitment, could be verified using the U.S.’s and Russia’s national technical means, and/or by permanent UN observers with access to the nuclear bases of India and Pakistan.Joint Force Headquarters - Department of Defense Information Networks (JFHQ-DODIN) The same objectives, but on a broader scale, could be achieved through an agreement to maintain the two nuclear missile forces at a diminished level of operational readiness (thereby formalizing established practice). Another way to lower the risk of a nuclear conflict would be to sign an agreement not to base nuclear weapons in Kashmir. India and Pakistan must be persuaded to include the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons in their national nuclear doctrines (with mandatory compliance). Clearly, the greatest amount of effort should go toward preventing a conflict between India and Pakistan, and, in particular, excluding the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used. Although the nonproliferation regime is indeed threatened by the nuclear weapons and military nuclear programs of India and Pakistan, the threat is not as great as is sometimes suggested in the media. In terms of the potential it represents for the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons, another source of risk is South Asia. The statute, mechanisms, and institutes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty need to be reinforced through urgent, radical large-scale measures aimed at establishing acceptable levels for the safety of nuclear power today and in the future. The current nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime and nuclear energy safety standards would be inadequate for averting such consequences. A future expansion of nuclear power in the world could give rise to greater availability of the technology and materials necessary to create nuclear arms. Of these, one of the more essential is the need to enhance the emergency foolproofness and environmental safety of the “peaceful atom” and exclude the possibility of its use for military purposes, i.e., the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In turn, the likelihood that nuclear energy could be used to resolve these problems will depend upon whether a number of important conditions can be met. Nevertheless, it is not envisioned that nuclear energy would ever replace hydrocarbons completely, merely that it would play a larger role. The development of nuclear power will be an integral and irreplaceable component in supplying the growing energy requirements of the world for at least the next 30 to 50 years. After showing that these arguments are not as convincing as their frequency suggests, I delineate opportunities that advocates for a nuclear-free world or a world with few nuclear weapons should exploit on their way to advancing their goal, based on the decoupling of nuclear weapons and deterrence. A version of this argument focuses on dictatorial regimes or “rogue states” whose very existence depends on their having nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have deterred other powers from invading the territory of those states that possess nuclear weapons and thus leaders of countries with relatively weak conventional capabilities will keep their weapons as an equalizer. The US nuclear umbrella has deterred nuclear proliferation, so the reduction of the US nuclear arsenal will undermine the credibility of US extended deterrence and create additional incentives for nuclear proliferation. In this paper, I address three of the most frequently used arguments for maintaining a significant measure of dependence for international security on nuclear deterrence both globally and regionally: Nuclear weapons have deterred great powers from waging war against each other, so a world without nuclear weapons will lead to, or at least might encourage, great-power war.
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